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Abstract
Firms that sell via a direct channel and via indirect channels have to decide whether
to allow third-party sellers to use the trademarked brand name of the product in their
advertising. This question has been particularly controversial for advertising on search
engines. In June 2009, Google started allowing any third-party reseller for a product to
use a trademark, such as ‘Doubletree,’ in the text of its ad, even if the reseller did not
have the trademark holder’s permission. We study the effects of this change empirically
within the hotel industry. We find some evidence that allowing third-party sellers to
use a trademark in their online search advertising weakly reduced the likelihood of a
consumer clicking on a trademark holder’s paid search ads. However, the decrease in
paid clicks was outweighed by a large increase in consumers clicking on the unpaid links
to the hotelier’s website within the main search results. Our evidence shows that when
third-party sellers focus on the trademarked brand in their ads, their ads become less
distinct, and customers are more likely to ignore the advertised offers and buy from
the direct channel.
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1 Introduction
Suppose a consumer wants to book a room at a Doubletree hotel and searches for ‘Doubletree’
on a search engine. Next to the main search results there will be a separate set of paid search
ads that each contain a link to a website. These ads will not only be for the direct channel
(Doubletree.com), but also for third-party resellers such as www.HotelReservations.com.
Should Doubletree allow third-parties to use the ‘Doubletree’ trademark in the text of their
ads? If the use of the trademark legitimizes the third-party seller as an alternative outlet
for the brand, the trademark holder may lose money. Doubletree will have to pay 10%
commission to the agent, which it could have avoided had the customer not been diverted
from Doubletree’s own websites. Even worse, a travel agency website may lead the consumer
to book a room at a competing hotel. Such fears have led legal analysts to estimate losses of
$400 million annually for the hotel industry due to use of trademarks to trigger ads and in ad-
copy by third-party sellers (Ripin, 2007); such practices have been referred to as ‘poaching’
(Sayedi et al., 2011).
The advertising literature has a different prediction. Koch and Ullman (1985); Itti
(2005)’s work on visual distinctness suggest that the salience of a paid search ad is not
determined solely by its own design but also by the extent to which it is distinct from paid
search ads. Similarity in ad features leads to competitive ad clutter (Kent and Allen, 1993;
Pieters et al., 2007; Danaher et al., 2008; Goldfarb and Tucker, 2011b), which reduces the
efficacy of advertising. If third-party sellers ads highlight the same trademark, they risk
becoming less distinct, and consumers may choose instead the non-advertised path to the di-
rect channel. Therefore, the empirical consequences of the use of trademarks by third-party
sellers are not clear-cut, making this an empirical question.
In June 2009, Google began allowing advertisers to use trademarks in the text of their
paid search ads even if they did not have the permission of the trademark holder. Paid search
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ads appear in a separate column next to the main search results when consumers query a
specific search term. Firms must pay for clicks on links in their paid ads but do not pay for
clicks on the link in the main result.
We compare changes in click behavior by customers who used a search engine to query
major US hotel brand trademarks before and after the policy change. We use aggregate data
from comScore that describes which websites US consumers visited after searching Google
or Yahoo! using a trademarked search term from April to August 2009. We compare how
clicks changed on Google (where the policy change occurred) to Yahoo! (where there was
no such change in policy).
We find little evidence of harm to the trademark’s direct channel. The trademark holder’s
website did receive (marginally) fewer clicks on its paid search ads after the change in policy.
However the decrease was outweighed by a large increase in the number of clicks on the
non-paid link to the trademark holder’s website within the main search results. When third-
party ads started displaying the trademark, search engine users started clicking directly on
the main link to the trademark holder’s website.
Our finding is robust to different functional forms, specifications, and control groups.
We show that no such effect occurred in the previous year or for related searches that were
unaffected by the policy change. We also replicate our results in the controlled conditions
of an online survey, and we show that when advertising is already indistinct, no such effect
occurs from the addition of trademarks. Furthermore, when a larger number of ads contribute
to the clutter, the positive spillover effects are stronger.
The interdependency between paid ads and non-paid links in search results is not a new
finding: Yang and Ghose (2010) find a positive interdependence between whether a paid ad
is present for a particular retailer and whether someone clicks through the retailer’s non-
paid listing, Chiou and Tucker (2010a) show that the extent of interdependence varies with
whether the search term is a brand name. What is novel about our study is the finding of
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spillover effects to the non-paid search result from other retailers’ ads if these ads highlight
the trademark. Such spillover effects are analogous to Anderson et al. (2010)’s finding that
when a catalog company shares its mailing list with a rival firm, sales actually increase for
some of the firm’s own products.
2 Policy Change
On May 14, 2009, Google announced that they would begin allowing advertisers to use a
trademark within the text of their ads without the trademark holder’s permission as long as
the trademark is referred to in ‘a descriptive or generic way,’ and the advertiser either resells
or offers information about the trademark holder’s products. This was a major shift from
Google’s previous policy where it required an advertiser to remove a trademarked term from
the text of the ad if it did not own the trademark.
Google began accepting such ads at 11am PDT on May 15th, but did not start displaying
them until June 15th. Figure 1(a) shows a mock-up of a search result for a Hyatt hotel before
the policy change. Only ads with generic wording were allowed. Figure 1(b) shows how the
same search result would have looked after the policy change. The search term is bolded in
the text, highlighting the trademark.
The question of how trademarked terms in search ads affects advertising outcomes is a
new one for the marketing literature. Earlier research such as Cohen (1986, 1991); Krasnikov
et al. (2009) have pointed out that trademarks present a crucial part of firm’s branding efforts.
Other topics have included research into how oﬄine search costs affects trademarks (Png and
Reitman, 1995) and trademark dilution (Morrin and Jacoby, 2000; Morrin et al., 2006).
The use of trademarks in search is an important question for marketing because it has
been claimed that the advent of search engines has turned trademark law ‘upside down’
(Zimmerman, 1999; Hursh, 2004). Much of the legal discussion has focused on the question




Figure 1: How the appearance of search results changed
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brand name (Bechtold, 2011).1 Empirically, such instances of competitive ‘piggy-backing’
have found to be rare (Rosso and Jansen, 2010).
Several legal cases have also focused on the use of trademarks in the ad copy. For
example, in Edina Realty Inc. v. TheMLSonline.com (2006), the Court objected that the
ad by TheMLSonline.com used the Edina Realty trademark as their headline. Similarly,
the recent European Court of Justice decision relating to Hotels Meridien v. Google France
(2004) and Accor v. Overture suggests that trademarks in ad content could be problematic.3
3 Conceptual Framework
This discussion shows that, in general, the legal policy literature has assumed that if third-
party resellers use a trademarked term in their advertising campaign, then this will hurt the
trademark holder. For example, O’Connor (2007) states that ‘customers are undoubtedly
being diverted and urgent action is needed to reclaim hotel trademarks in the search environ-
ment.’ This is echoed by Clemons and Madhani (2010), which suggests that such practices
by search engines are akin to anticompetitive behavior.
However, the effect of competing advertisers using trademarks online is not as clear-cut
as the legal literature might suggest. The literature ignores the fact that paid search ads are
only successful if they manage to divert consumers away from the main listing. Studies by
Kent and Allen (1993) and Danaher et al. (2008) show that when similar ads are presented
together, consumers perceive them as clutter and are more likely to ignore them. Eye-
tracker results from Pieters et al. (2007) emphasize that the similarity of ads determines
whether consumers view advertising as clutter. Theoretically, therefore, the introduction
1The rulings have been contradictory. For example, in Merck & Co. v. Mediplan Health Consulting,2
Merck lost its attempt to prevent Mediplan, a Canadian Internet pharmacy, from bidding on search terms
such as ‘Zocor”.Other rulings include Playboy v. Netscape, 354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004); GEICO v. Google,
330 F. Supp. 2d 700 (E.D. Va. 2004); Google v. American Blinds, 2005 WL 832398 (N.D. Cal. 2005), motion
reconsidered 2007 WL 1159950 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2007); 800-JR Cigar v. GoTo.com, 437 F. Supp. 2d 273
(D. N.J. 2006); Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc, 2009 WL 875447 (2d Cir. April 3, 2009).
3Advocate General’s Opinion in Joined Cases C-236/08, C-237/08 and C-238/08, 22 September 2009.
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of trademarks could increase advertising clutter in two ways. First, when all advertisers
focus their ad around the same trademark, consumers may experience each ad as being less
distinct. Paid ads will offer a less compelling reason for the consumer to divert from the
main non-paid listing. Second, if advertisers are encouraged to start advertising because they
can now use trademarks, then the number of similar ads will increase, again contributing to
clutter.
The theory predicts that the number of paid clicks for the trademark holder will decrease
as its ad is made less distinct relative to its competitors. However, the effect on non-paid
clicks for the trademark holder is ambiguous, and if the effects of advertising clutter are
strong enough, non-paid clicks for the trademark holder may even increase.
4 Field Studies
4.1 Data
We use data on consumer search and navigation behavior from comScore. ComScore tracks
the online activity of a panel of more than two million users in order to provide commercial
data products. ComScore is not open about its recruitment methods, but it does claim that
the panel is representative.
We had access to a database named comScore Marketer. The database records the
total aggregate number of paid and non-paid clicks that various websites received after a
search for a specified search term at major search engines for the past two years.4 We
extracted aggregate data on searches that contained the trademarked name for major hotel
brands in the US. We focus on the hotel industry for two reasons. First, since comScore
data records only whether someone visited a website and not their subsequent activity at
a website, we wanted to study a sector where a visit to a company’s website is meaningful
4The aggregate nature of this commercial dataset contrasts with the individual nature of the comScore
data for 100,000 panelists used by researchers such as Park and Fader (2004). However, this individual-level
data has only been released to researchers for 2002 and 2004, and so it cannot be used for this study.
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in itself. Hotel brand websites currently account for 69% of all online hotel bookings in
the US (PhoCusWright, 2009). Second, the hotel industry has been the setting for major
litigation over trademarks and search advertising. Owners of hotel brands do not have to
pay commission if they sell their rooms directly, so they have an incentive to direct internet
business to their site (Vinhas and Anderson, 2005).5.
To determine our sample of hotel brands, we started with the top 300 hotel brands as
reported by Hotels Magazine in its July 2007 edition.6 Of these, we identified brands that
were based primarily in the US and where comScore panel members conducted more than
one search in April 2009. Our sample contains 53 such brands. The vast majority of hotel
brands that we excluded were non-US brands such as Barcelo and Jin Jiang. We excluded
non-US brands because Google changed its policy only on its US website, and the majority
of comScore panel data members are located in the US. In a few instances, hotels maintain
explicit policies that prohibit their associated travel agents from using their trademark in
their ad copy. The major companies with these policies are Marriott and Intercontinental
Hotel Group. Consequently, we also exclude the brands owned by these companies from our
dataset.7 Later in the paper, we use these brands as a robustness check. The top panel of
Table 1 describes the monthly aggregate statistics for each search.
For each of these 53 different branded search terms, we collected aggregate data on the
number of paid and non-paid clicks to different websites after consumers used the trademark
as a search term.8 All of the hotels in our study engage in search advertising; they pay for
5There is additional empirical evidence that hotels may even be able to command a price premium in the
online channel (los Santosy et al., 2012)
6The 2008 and 2009 editions of this list only reported the top 50 brands, but there appears to be substantial
continuity across the years.
7These Marriott brands include Marriott, JW Marriott, Renaissance, Courtyard, Residence Inn, Fairfield
Inn, TownePlace Suites, Springhill Suites, Marriott Vacation Club, Ritz-Carlton, ExecuStay, and Marriott
Executive Apartments. Intercontinental Hotel Group’s brands include Holiday Inn and InterContinental
Hotels.
8We removed websites where the user was evidently not looking for information about hotels. For example,
we removed results for searches containing ‘Hilton’ that were webpages for celebrity gossip magazines and
video-sharing websites related to the celebrity Paris Hilton.
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some of the clicks their website receives. On average, our data suggests that hotel trademark
holder’s pay for 18% of the clicks they receive.9 A high correlation exists between the total
number of clicks and the number of rooms that a hotel chain controls (0.74). This provides
some face validity to the data. The correlation is weakest for economy motel chains such as
Econolodge, which presumably rely more heavily on ‘walk-in’customers than on customers
who book ahead online.
Table 1: Data summary
Mean Std. Dev.
Search Term Level
Monthly Average Paid Clicks for Search Term 25472.0 39378.5
Monthly Average Non-Paid Clicks for Search Term 109799.6 197655.6
Observation: Search Engine-Search Term-Website-Month
Paid Clicks 865.1 5675.8
Non-Paid Clicks 3729.0 24858.5
Google Search Engine 0.50 0.50
Trademark Holder Website 0.10 0.30
Number of Paid Ads associated with Search Term 4.11 4.58
Number of Third-Party Ads associated with Search Term 2.67 3.71
Notes: 6,360 Observations. Summary statistics from April 2009-September 2009.
In addition to the trademark holder’s website, people also visited 66 distinct third-party
websites in sufficient numbers for comScore to report data. The sites were either online
travel agencies (e.g., Expedia.com, Hotels.com) or websites that direct customers to online
travel agencies (e.g., Tripadvisor).
Since comScore provides data on a monthly basis, we collected this data for April-October
2009. In our main analysis, we compare April and May 2009 with July and August 2009.
We use the September and October data in our analysis of long-run effects in Section 4.5.
We omit data from June 2009 from our empirical analysis, as the date of the policy change
9Table A-1 in the appendix records the total number of clicks by search term and the proportion of these
clicks which are paid over the period we study for each of the hotel websites.
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(June 15) fell exactly in the middle of that month, making inference difficult. We use data
for the Yahoo! and Google search engines. On June 3 2009, Microsoft rebranded its live
search engine as ‘Bing,’ making it a problematic candidate for a control group.
An observation occurs at the Search Engine-Search Term-Website-Month level. For ex-
ample, we observe the number of paid and non-paid clicks that Hilton.com receives in a
month from people who use the search term ‘Hilton’ on Yahoo!. There are 795 observed
website and search-term combinations for each search engine in each month. The bottom
panel of Table 1 describes our data at this level.
4.2 Univariate Analysis
Figures 2(a) and 2(b) compare the paid and non-paid clicks for each search term before
and after the policy change (May and July) on Yahoo! and Google.10 Two patterns are
apparent. First, paid clicks fell for trademark holders on Google after the policy change
relative to Yahoo!, much as hoteliers feared. However, a large increase occurred in non-
paid clicks for trademark holders at the same time. The small gains in paid clicks for the
non-trademark holder sites do not appear significantly different from the patterns on Yahoo!.
To check that the variation was not simply seasonal, we collected similar data for 2008.
Figures 2(c) and 2(d) shows the results. Reassuringly, there was no upward shift in ‘non-
paid’ clicks or downward shift in ‘paid’ clicks on Google for trademark holders for similar
months in a previous year. Instead, the general trend in ‘paid’ clicks appeared to be upward
(perhaps owing to a larger number of summer bookings) on both Yahoo! and Google with
little change in non-paid clicks.
4.3 Empirical Analysis
We formalize the insights of Figure 2 in an econometric framework. For each website i, that
is potentially reached by consumers who search trademarked brand name j on search engine
10For simplicity, we look only at May and July, the months surrounding the policy change. For complete-
ness, we report the full monthly analysis in Figure A-1.
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(a) # Paid clicks in 2009 (b) # Non-Paid clicks in 2009
(c) # Paid clicks in 2008 (No Policy Change) (d) # Non-Paid clicks in 2008 (No Policy Change)
Figure 2: How the number of clicks an average website received changed on Google and
Yahoo!.
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k in month t, we model the number of clicks as:
clicksijkt = +β1TMHolderij × PostChanget ×Googlek + β2TMHolderij × PostChanget
+β3PostChanget ×Googlek + β4TMHolderij × PostChanget
+β5PostChanget + β6montht + γijk + ijk
The variable TMHolderij is an indicator variable that equals 1 if website i is the trademark
holder for hotel brand j and 0 otherwise. Googlek is an indicator variable that equals 1
if the search engine is Google, and 0 if the search engine is Yahoo!. PostChanget is an
indicator variable that equals 1 if the month occurs after June 15, 2009 and 0 if it occurs
before. The vector γijk includes fixed effects at the Search Engine-Search Term-Website
level. These fixed effects are collinear with the main effects of TMHolderij, Googlek, and
TMHolderij×Googlek, which are consequently omitted. The variable montht is an indicator
variable for whether or not it is the month of May in the pre-test period.11 We estimate this
model using ordinary least squares. We cluster standard errors at the Search Engine-Search
Term-Website level.12
Table 2 presents the results of this specification. Column (1) presents the estimates for
the number of non-paid clicks, which is our key variable of interest. As explained in Section
3, changes in the distinctiveness of paid search may have potential spillover effects to the
main results. The positive and significant coefficient estimate of 13,432 for TMHolderij ×
PostChanget × Googlek suggests a large increase in non-paid clicks by users who directly
navigated to the trademark holders’ websites through the main search results after the change
11We are limited from estimating a specification with a full set of monthly fixed effects due to collinearity
with the PostChanget variable. The indicator variable for May tests for a pre-existing trend in clicks before
the policy change. The results are very similar if this indicator variable is omitted.
12In Table A-4, in the appendix, we report results for a specification where we collapse the data into
pre-policy and post-policy totals. This is an alternative method to clustering for addressing the concerns
expressed by Bertrand et al. (2004) about using multiple-month data for policy evaluation. The results are
similar to before, though the larger point estimates reflect the conflation of the two months.
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Table 2: Trademark holders lose paid clicks but gain non-paid clicks after the policy change
(1) (2) (3)
Non-Paid Clicks Paid Clicks Total Clicks
PostChange × Google × TMHolder 13431.6∗∗∗ -3269.0∗ 10162.7∗∗∗
(3635.5) (1744.1) (2997.9)
PostChange × Google -3.908 18.56 14.65
(78.91) (44.08) (92.36)
PostChange × TMHolder -454.4 73.99 -380.4
(893.9) (671.5) (1078.8)
PostChange 148.7 14.48 163.2
(94.53) (46.44) (110.7)
May Indicator 6.184 -34.46 -28.28
(159.2) (68.68) (186.8)
Search Engine-Search Term-Website Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6360 6360 6360
R-Squared 0.176 0.154 0.179
Notes: Ordinary Least Squares estimates. An observation is the number of clicks for a website in a month
for searches using a specific trademarked term on a specific search engine. April, May, July, August
2009 data. Google × TMHolder, Google, TMHolder are dropped due to their collinearity with the Search
Engine-Search Term-Website fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at search-term level.* p < 0.10, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
in policy on Google (relative to Yahoo!). This supports the theory that growing indistinctness
of paid ads encourage users to navigate simply to the main non-paid listing.
In Column (2) we display results for the change in number of clicks on paid links. The
(marginally) significant coefficient estimate for TMHolderij ×PostChanget×Googlek sug-
gests that after the policy change, trademark holder websites experienced a decrease of
around 3,269 paid clicks on Google as compared to Yahoo!. The result is as expected and
follows conventional legal wisdom about the negative effects of permitting trademark dilution
on an advertising message. When other paid ads could use the trademark, the trademark
holder’s ad was less distinctive and attracted fewer clicks. However, a comparison of Columns
(1) and (2) suggests that the decrease in paid clicks was outweighed four-fold by the increase
in non-paid clicks. Column (3) evaluates the effect of the policy change on total clicks to the
website. The policy change was associated with a net increase of 10,163 in the number of
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monthly visits to the direct channel website. The lower-order interactions are insignificant
in all three columns.
We then re-estimate the model using a semi-log (log-linear) specification. We use a semi-
log specification because it can be interpreted in terms of percentage changes, addressing
the concern that our results might be driven by the difference in the absolute level of clicks
between Google and Yahoo! (as observed in Figures 2(a) and 2(b)) or by extreme values. We
estimate the semi-log specification using the generalized estimating equation (GEE) frame-
work (Mullahy, 1999; Manning and Mullahy, 2001). The logarithmic transformation inherent
in this specification means that the results can be interpreted as a percentage change. These
results suggest that the number of non-paid clicks increased by 42% after the change in
policy for trademark holders on Google and that total clicks increase by 26% relatively. The
decrease in paid clicks for trademark holders on Google after the policy change is no longer
significant, though the point estimate is large. In this specification, the coefficient on the
indicator PostChanget is significant and positive, as one might expect demand for hotel
rooms to increase during the summer months. The interaction PostChanget×TMHolderij,
however, is negative and significant, nullifying the positive effect of PostChanget and sug-
gesting no such increase for trademark holders’ sites. This may reflect that the increase
in clicks for summer travel was driven by leisure customers who may be more likely than
business travelers to click on third-party resellers.
4.4 Robustness Checks
The results in Table 2 suggest that trademark holders actually received more clicks after the
change in trademark policy. This goes against the conventional legal wisdom, so we checked
the robustness and plausibility of our results in multiple ways. We discuss these checks in
this section.
14
Table 3: Log specification: Trademark holders lose paid clicks but gain non-paid clicks after
the policy change
(1) (2) (3)
Non-Paid Clicks Paid Clicks Total Clicks
PostChange × Google × TMHolder 0.419∗∗∗ -0.673 0.262∗∗
(0.132) (0.493) (0.122)
PostChange × Google -0.112 0.326 -0.0747
(0.0897) (0.452) (0.0926)
PostChange × TMHolder -0.269∗∗ -0.218 -0.246∗∗
(0.113) (0.250) (0.0985)
PostChange 0.250∗∗∗ 0.207 0.234∗∗∗
(0.0757) (0.219) (0.0741)
May Indicator 0.0229 -0.0628 0.00346
(0.0563) (0.0814) (0.0535)
Search Engine-Search Term-Website Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6360 6360 6360
R-Squared 0.178 0.173 0.188
Notes: Log-linear specification. An observation is the number of clicks for a website in a month for searches
using a specific trademarked term on a specific search engine. April, May, July, August 2009 data.
Log-Linear Specification. Google × TMHolder, Google, TMHolder are dropped due to their collinearity
with the Search Engine-Search Term-Website fixed effects. The Generalized Estimating Equation estimates
implying population-averaged effects rather than standard fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at
search-term level.* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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4.4.1 Control Group Checks
To be a valid control group, Yahoo! users must behave similarly to Google users in the
absence of a policy change. We control for static differences between Yahoo! and Google, but
a concern may be that the composition of users may be changing in a way that could distort
our results - this process is sometimes referred to as maturation (Cook and Campbell, 1979).
This would be particularly problematic if the composition of Google users shifted towards
groups of people who were more likely to simply use search engines as a navigation tool and
not click on ads relative to Yahoo!. To investigate this, we collected data from Experian
Hitwise on the demographic profile of Google Search and Yahoo! Search users in the period
we study. Table A-2 in the appendix indicates that the income and age distribution of Google
and Yahoo! users appears relatively similar, and remains similar over the period we study.13
Yahoo! has slightly more female users than Google, but this pattern did not change over the
period we study. Table A-3 in the appendix also shows that no other interface or operational
changes occurred on either Yahoo! or Google.
4.4.2 Falsification Checks
We have already shown that there was no similar trend in 2008 for Google relative to Yahoo!
(Figures 2(c) and 2(d)). However, there is still the possibility of time-varying unobserved
factors, or history (Cook and Campbell, 1979), that were specific to 2009. For instance,
perhaps Google did not publicly report a change in the search engine’s algorithm, which
led to hotel websites being highlighted more within the main results. To check for such
possibilities, we conducted two ‘falsification checks.’
In the first falsification check, we looked at a set of trademark holder clicks that were not
affected by Google’s policy change, and we examine whether they exhibited a similar pattern
to that displayed in Table 2. We looked specifically at searches where consumers navigated
13We also checked that our results held if we only looked at searches that only used the trademarks, which
helps us rule out time-varying heterogeneity in the nature of search terms used.
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to a trademark holder’s website after searching on a competitor’s trademark. Such searches
were not affected by the policy change because Google only permitted advertisers who sold
the specific brand to use the trademark in their ad copy. For example, Hilton could not
use ‘Marriott’ in its ad copy. If our results capture a general increase in consumer clicks
to trademark holders’ non-paid link in the summer of 2009 on Google relative to Yahoo!,
then these estimates should show a similar decrease in paid search activity and an increase
in non-paid searches. However, as reported in Table A-5 in the appendix, all estimates are
insignificant. This suggests that no global pattern persisted whereby customers searching for
trademarks were more likely to visit brand-name sites using non-paid links from the main
search results on Google compared to Yahoo!.
As a further falsification test, we also checked whether any such effect existed for hotel
brands that explicitly forbade third-party sellers from using their trademark in a search. We
used data on searches involving these brands that we had excluded from our main dataset
reported in Table 1. Table A-6 in the appendix displays the results for the subset of brands
that did appear successful in restricting their third-party sellers from advertising next to
their trademark. As expected, the coefficient for PostChanget×Google× TMHolderSiteij
is insignificant.
4.4.3 Replication using Different Control Group
To make sure that our results were robust to using only ‘within-Google’ variation in behavior,
we collected further data on the search behavior among people seeking hotels using generic
non-branded search terms. Specifically, we collected data on the search outcomes of Google
users who did not search for a brand but instead searched for a hotel in a specific geographic
destination, e.g., someone who searched for ‘Atlanta Hotel’ or ‘Atlanta Hotels.’ The idea
is that such searchers on Google who are also investigating booking a hotel but who focus
on a location rather than a brand should be subject to similar unobserved time-varying
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shocks and impulses. We collected this kind of search data for the top 10 most populous
metropolitan statistical areas in the US.14 Since these are generic searches and city names
are not subject to trademark restrictions, these types of searches were not affected by the
policy change.
We then analyzed whether the trademark searches enjoyed a similar increase in clicks
relative to these non-trademark searches. If there was no difference, this might suggest that
our result simply reflects a shift in preferences of Google users seeking travel information
towards clicking on the top main search result rather than paid search results in the period
we study. Table 4 displays our results for this new data sample. In this specification, the new
indicator variable TrademarkSearchj is 1 when the search was conducted using a trademark
and is 0 if the searcher used a geographical term. Even with using only variation among
searchers on Google seeking hotel information, the positive coefficient for PostChanget ×
TMHolderij × TrademarkSearchj suggests a sizable increase in the number of non-paid
clicks for branded website in the main results for the trademark searches relative to non-
trademark searches associated with the timing of the policy change. Since the regression
uses a different dataset, the absolute numbers cannot be directly compared to Table 4.15
4.5 Magnitude of the Spillover Effects
The coefficient size suggested by these log-results is large with an overall effect size of 26%.
In this section, we investigate how long an effect of this size persisted and how the size of
the effect varied across websites.
14New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, Dallas, Houston, Miami, Atlanta, Washington D.C., Philadelphia, and
Boston.
15The log estimates reported in the online technical appendix to the paper suggest a slightly larger positive
effect proportionally for non-paid clicks and a larger negative effect proportionally for non-paid clicks when
we analyze only within-Google variation after the policy change.
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Table 4: Comparison between trademark name searches and generic searches on Google only
after change in policy
(1) (2) (3)
Non-Paid Clicks Paid Clicks Total Clicks
PostChange × TM Holder × Trademark Search 7885.6∗∗∗ -2370.8∗∗ 5514.9∗∗∗
(2068.7) (1148.8) (1627.8)
PostChange -423.2∗ -134.3 -557.5∗
(239.3) (104.7) (291.5)
Search Term-Website Controls Yes Yes Yes
Month Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4243 4243 4243
R-Squared 0.0195 0.0254 0.0201
Notes: Ordinary Least Squares estimates. An observation is the number of clicks for a website in a month
for searches using either a trademarked search term or a geographical (top 10 by population US city) hotel
search term on Google. April, May, July, August 2009 data. Lower-order interactions for TrademarkSearch
and TMHolder with PostChange are not separately identified for non-paid clicks as the geographical
searches did not produce trademark holders’ websites as primary search results. Standard errors clustered
at search-term level.* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
4.5.1 Persistence of the Spillover Effects
It seems unlikely that in equilibrium, third-party resellers continued to highlight trademarks
in their ads after it became evident that such a strategy was not that effective. To study this,
we collected data over time on the number of ads that appeared for each branded search.
We measured the number of ads by how many separate websites received a paid click for
that search term on each search engine. Figure 3 shows how the number of ads evolved on
Google compared to Yahoo! over the months surrounding the policy change. It is clear that
an increase in the number of ads by non-trademark holders occurred after the policy change
on the Google search engine in July as advertisers took advantage of the new opportunity
of highlighting a trademark. However, no such significant change occurred on Yahoo!.
Figure 3 also shows that the increase in the number of ads displayed for trademark
searches on Google after the policy change relative to Yahoo! fell after the initial months.
This is not surprising as Figure 2(a) suggests that only small gains in paid clicks for non-
trademark holders after the policy change. Many advertisers on search engines rely on
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Figure 3: How the average number of ads for each search term changed on Google and
Yahoo! across multiple months
automated systems that allocate their expenditures to advertising campaigns that attract
the most click-throughs, since search engines’ pricing algorithms penalize advertisers who do
not attract sufficient clicks. Therefore, advertisers tend not to continue to run ads that do
not attract significant clicks.
Therefore, large gains in non-paid clicks to trademark holders may not have been sus-
tained if third parties pulled the inefficient ads. To examine this, Table 5 repeats the analysis
of Table 2 but includes data from September and October 2009. It compares the effect for
July and August 2009 (captured by ‘PostChange’) with the incremental shift in the effect in
September and October (labeled as ‘long-term’). The new long-term interaction is captured
by an indicator variable LongTerm, which is equal to 1 if it was September or October.
PostChange continues to indicate whether the month occurs after the policy change. The
coefficient for LongTerm×Google×TMHolder is negative for non-paid clicks, though only
marginally significant in the linear specification and insignificant in the log specification.
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Table 5: The spillover effects decreased in the long run
(1) (2) (3)
Non-Paid Clicks Paid Clicks Total Clicks
PostChange × Google × TMHolder 15917.6∗∗∗ -1203.1 14714.4∗∗∗
(4120.9) (1573.6) (4139.3)
Long-Term × Google × TMHolder -4340.8∗ -2196.4∗ -6537.1∗∗
(2345.6) (1239.3) (2893.6)
PostChange 343.1∗∗∗ 56.56∗∗ 399.7∗∗∗
(85.05) (25.57) (89.20)
PostChange × Google -188.7 14.97 -173.8
(142.3) (35.77) (147.5)
PostChange × TMHolder 1900.2∗∗ 1298.9∗∗ 3199.1∗∗
(890.5) (602.9) (1261.2)
Long-Term -317.1∗∗∗ -73.84∗∗ -391.0∗∗∗
(76.36) (34.79) (85.60)
Long-Term × Google 56.24 37.75 93.98
(142.3) (32.18) (147.2)
Long-Term × TMHolder -2582.0∗∗∗ -1128.3∗ -3710.2∗∗∗
(966.5) (612.7) (1138.0)
May Indicator -298.5∗∗ -45.95 -344.5∗∗
(124.1) (66.67) (148.0)
Search Engine-Search Term-Website Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11130 11130 11130
R-Squared 0.0744 0.173 0.0871
Notes: Ordinary Least Squares estimates. An observation is the number of clicks for a website in a month
for searches using a specific trademarked term on a specific search engine. April, May, July, August,
September, October 2009 data. Pre-policy months are April and May 2009. Long-term effect captures
the incremental change in PostChange in September and October 2009. Google × TMHolder, Google,
TMHolder are dropped due to their collinearity with the Search Engine-Search Term-Website fixed effects.
Standard errors clustered at search-term level.* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
This suggests that the short-run effect of spillover effects from other retailers’ ads on non-
paid clicks decreased after August by 4,380, though a sizable effect still exists. Given the
reduction in number of competitor ads and the results of Table 6, the positive effect for the
direct channel is mediated by the number of third-party-seller ads (presumably) highlight-
ing the trademark. The negative coefficient for LongTerm×Google× TMHolder for paid
clicks does suggest that the reduction in paid clicks persisted, though again this is marginally
significant in the linear specification and is not significant in the log specification.
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4.5.2 Search Engine Motivation
A remaining question is why Google would allow the use of trademarks in paid search ads
if it encouraged non-paid clicks. Since we cannot obtain pricing data, we cannot calculate
the full equilibrium effect on revenues. We believe that the answer lies in the increase in
prices that advertisers paid for each of these bids. As discussed by Goldfarb and Tucker
(2011a), there is huge variation in the prices of ads on search engines. Ultimately, without
competition, a click would only be worth around $0.10, reflecting Google’s minimum bid for
a click. However, with competition, given the sealed-bid second-price auction mechanism
used to price each click, the prices would rise rapidly. For example, Pfanner (2010) quotes
Interflora as saying that when Google allowed other firms to bid on trademarks in the UK,
the cost of buying its own name rose from 3-4 cents per click to as 42 cents per click, costing
an additional $750,000 in the first year. Therefore, potentially Google may have strategically
decided to trade off fewer clicks if it led to an increase in revenues through higher prices.
4.6 Mechanism
As described in Section 3, when consumers search a trademarked brand name, they are
likely intending to navigate to the brand’s website. The paid search results have to offer
something compelling and distinct to distract the consumer from their original purpose.
However, if all ads focus around the same trademark, then they become less distinct and
are more likely to be perceived as advertising clutter. We use our data to provide evidence
for this mechanism in two ways. First, we show that the effect is greater when there is a
larger number of ads contributing to the clutter. Second, we show that the negative effect is
greater for non-trademark holders’ ads that would otherwise have a more strikingly different
value proposition from the direct channel.
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Table 6: Changes in paid search and non-paid search by number of competitors’ ads
(1) (2) (3)
Non-Paid Clicks Paid Clicks Total Clicks
PostChange × Google × TMHolder × # Comp Using TM 5719.9∗∗∗ -1961.3∗∗∗ 3758.6∗∗∗
(560.1) (225.9) (577.5)
PostChange × Google × TMHolder 6256.7∗∗∗ -891.5 5365.3∗∗∗
(1412.7) (569.8) (1456.6)
PostChange × Google × # Comp. Using TM -29.66 16.50 -13.16
(173.4) (69.93) (178.8)
# Comp. Using TM -52.46 7.081 -45.37
(164.0) (66.16) (169.1)
PostChange × # Comp. Using TM 40.53 0.133 40.67
(117.8) (47.53) (121.5)
Google × # Comp Using TM 34.55 -8.828 25.72
(216.5) (87.31) (223.2)
TMHolder × # Comp Using TM 972.8 -464.0∗ 508.8
(623.1) (251.3) (642.5)
PostChange × TMHolder × # Comp Using TM 253.7 34.16 287.9
(382.9) (154.4) (394.8)
Google × TMHolder × # Comp Using TM -1484.5∗ 1747.9∗∗∗ 263.5
(836.5) (337.4) (862.5)
PostChange 62.29 8.865 71.15
(397.7) (160.4) (410.1)
PostChange × Google 69.22 -9.286 59.94
(506.3) (204.2) (522.0)
PostChange × TMHolder -1153.0 128.4 -1024.6
(1044.7) (421.4) (1077.2)
May Indicator 6.431 -39.50 -33.08
(236.6) (95.44) (244.0)
Search Engine-Search Term-Website Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6360 6360 6360
R-Squared 0.291 0.0160 0.287
Notes: Ordinary Least Squares estimates. An observation is the number of clicks for a website in a
month for searches using a specific trademarked term on a specific search engine. April, May, July, August
2009 data. Google × TMHolder, Google, and TMHolder are dropped due to their collinearity with the
Search Engine-Search Term-Website fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at search-term level.* p < 0.10,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
4.6.1 The Spillover Effects Increase in the Quantity of Advertising Clutter
A greater the number of ads increase the perception of advertising clutter (Danaher et al.,
2008; Pieters et al., 2007). Therefore, we would expect the effect of exposure to increase
with the number of ads displayed by third-party sellers after the policy change.
Table 6 displays a specification that allows the effect of the policy change to vary with
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the number of ads displayed by third-party sellers. This should pick up the variation in the
number of third-party seller ads observed in Figure 3. The key effect is captured by the
four-way interaction PostChanget×Googlek×TMHolderij×No.Comp.UsingTMijtk. The
positive coefficient for PostChanget×Googlek×TMHolderij×No.Comp.UsingTMijtk for
non-paid clicks suggests that as expected the positive incremental effect of the policy change
increased in the number of third-party reseller ads. Similarly, the negative coefficient for
PostChanget×Googlek×TMHolder×No.Comp.UsingTMijtk for paid clicks suggests that
the negative effect of the policy change for paid clicks indeed increased in the number of
third-party reseller ads.16
Table 6 suggests that the effect of the policy change for trademark holders was indeed
moderated by the number of non-trademark holder ads that appeared after the policy change
on Google.
4.6.2 Negative Spillovers for Third Parties with the Most Distinct Message
Pre-policy
We then turned to see whether the negative effects of this policy were felt hardest by web-
sites that potentially could have put forward the most distinctive advertising message. To
explore this, we identified websites that had a very salient ‘low-price’ brand message. If
these websites changed the text of their ads to reflect the trademarks, they may have lost
the opportunity to make their offering distinct, and their ad may have been more likely to
be viewed as advertising clutter and ignored. As documented by Anderson et al. (2010) such
price orientated marketing messages online often halt consumer search as consumers focus
on the ‘cheap’ offering.
We re-ran the specification in Table 2 with a new interaction for non-trademark holder
sites whose websites’ URLs contain the word ‘cheap,’ ‘bargains,’ ‘discounts,’ or ‘deal.’ This
16We also estimated this specification to explore how the policy affected click outcomes for third-party
resellers, but our estimates were imprecise.
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Table 7: Websites that focused on offering discounted prices received fewer paid clicks after
the policy change
(1) (2) (3)
Non-Paid Clicks Paid Clicks Total Clicks
PostChange × Google × TMHolder 13425.4∗∗∗ -3318.3∗ 10107.2∗∗∗
(3636.3) (1744.5) (2998.8)
PostChange × Google × Bargain Site -43.91 -351.9∗∗ -395.8∗∗
(104.8) (149.0) (183.1)
PostChange × Google 2.242 67.85 70.09
(91.30) (45.52) (104.5)
PostChange × TMHolder -478.1 117.7 -360.4
(894.5) (671.5) (1079.3)
PostChange 172.4∗ -29.21 143.2
(98.92) (44.00) (113.6)
PostChange × Bargain Site -169.2∗∗∗ 311.9∗∗ 142.7
(55.59) (143.2) (153.2)
May Indicator 6.184 -34.46 -28.28
(159.2) (68.69) (186.8)
Search Engine-Search Term-Website Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6360 6360 6360
R-Squared 0.176 0.152 0.179
Notes: Ordinary Least Squares estimates. An observation is the number of clicks for a website in a month
for searches using a specific trademarked term on a specific search engine. April, May, July, August 2009
data. Google × TMHolder, Google × Bargain Site, Google, TMHolder, Bargain Site are dropped due to
their collinearity with the Search Engine-Search Term-Website fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at
search-term level.* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
is represented by the new indicator variable BargainSite which is equal to 1 if the URL
contains one of these words, and 0 otherwise. No trademark holders’ websites were classified
as bargain sites. This allows us to distinguish third-party sellers that are price-focused.
As shown in Table 7, the negative coefficient for PostChanget × Googlek × BargainSitei
for paid search clicks suggests that these paid clicks decreased for these ‘bargain’ websites
relative to third-party websites on Google after the policy change.17 This occurs despite
the fact that the coefficient on PostChanget × BargainSitei is positive, which suggests a
time trend, as one might expect, for more clicks on such sites during the summer months.
17There were very few non-paid clicks for these bargain websites, making precision difficult in a regression
with non-paid clicks as a dependent variable.
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Websites that were most likely to have the largest shift in their advertising emphasis if they
emphasized trademarks suffered the most from the change of policy. Of course, since we
do not observe how advertising content changed as a result of the policy change, this is
somewhat speculative.18 To obtain more conclusive evidence with full knowledge of what
ads are being show we turned to the lab.
5 Lab Experiment
Since the empirical results suggest a sizeable positive effect that runs against conventional
legal wisdom, we replicated our results and obtained direct behavioral evidence of the mech-
anism in the laboratory.
We conducted the lab experiment online and used Mechanical Turk to recruit 346 survey-
takers.19 They were randomly allocated to one of six scenarios [(Baseline, Indistinct, Many
Ads)×(Trademarks, No Trademarks)].20 The stimuli for each of these conditions are pre-
sented in Figure 4. In the ‘Trademarks’ conditions, the third-party ads displayed trademarks,
in the ‘No Trademarks’ conditions they did not.
In the ‘Baseline’ conditions, we aim to replicate the main field experiment. In the ‘In-
distinct’ conditions, we changed the third-party ads so that they no longer mentioned their
price advantage but instead said something non-specific and indistinct about quality. In
such scenarios there should be less of an effect of the introduction of trademarks as the ads
will already be perceived as clutter. In the ‘Many Ads’ conditions, we changed the number
of ads that respondents saw.21 Pieters et al. (2007) argue that larger numbers of indistinct
18It is also possible that the removal of ad messages emphasizing price reduced relative perceptions of
quality for the trademark holders’ paid link. However, this is not consistent with the observed increase in
number of unpaid clicks.
19Ferraro (2008) suggests that Mechanical Turk respondents are more likely to be female, of South Asian
descent, and to have a college degree relative to the representative American in the 2000 Census, but the
respondents’ typical characteristics also tend to be typical of heavy Internet users.
20We removed responses from 24 survey-takers whose IP address suggested that they originated from the
same address.
21Table 6 presented evidence that our results are moderated by the number of ads. However, in the field
data the number of ads was endogenous to the introduction of the policy, rendering it not a clean test.
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(a) Baseline: No Trademark (b) Baseline Trademark
(c) Indistinct: No Trademark (d) Indistinct: Trademark
(e) Multiple Ads: No Trademark (f) Multiple Ads: Trademark
Figure 4: Lab Experiment Stimuli
ads increase advertising clutter. Therefore, we expect the spillover effects to be largest in
the condition with Trademarks and more ads.
In each condition, above the screenshot, we stated, ‘Imagine you are trying to book a
hotel room which you have to pay for. You use a search engine to search for ‘Boston Hyatt’
and see the following search result’. We then asked respondents which option they would
use to book their hotel room. The options were the trademark holder’s non-paid link, the
trademark holder’s paid link, the third-parties’ paid link, or continuing to search for further
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information.
Figure 5(a) presents the outcomes of the experiment for whether the respondents would
use the trademark holder’s non-paid link to book their hotel in each of the conditions. In the
Baseline scenario, a higher proportion of respondents said they would book a hotel using the
main non-paid link if trademarks were present (51% vs 69%, t=2.07, p-value=0.04). In the
Indistinct scenario, as predicted, there was no change in the proportion of people who were
prepared to use a third-party’s link to book their website (71% vs 78%, t=.74, p-value>0.1).
In the Multiple Ads scenario, a higher proportion of respondents said they would book a
hotel using the main non-paid link (31% vs 67%, t=4.18, p-value<0.01) when trademarks
are present. The difference is larger and more significant than in the Baseline scenario where
there were fewer listings.
We then examined the effects of the change on the likelihood of a respondent using the
trademark holder’s paid link. As illustrated by Figure 5(b), there was no significant difference
across subjects who saw trademarks and those who did not in any of the scenarios. This
insignificance echoes the lack of precision of the effect of the policy change on paid clicks for
the trademark holder reported in Section 4.3.
Figure 5(c) summarizes the results for the proportion of people who would use a third
party’s link to book their hotel. In the Baseline and Indistinct scenarios, there was no
significant difference, but in the ‘Multiple Ads’ scenario there was a drop in the number
of people who were prepared to use a third party’s link to book their website (31% vs
16%, t=2.10, p-value=0.04) when trademarks were present which is suggestive that the
combination of trademarks with multiple ads is particularly off-putting.
Figure 5(d), shows how the proportion of users deciding to continue search changed in
each of the scenarios. There was no significant change in the Indistinct scenario. However,
in the Baseline and Multiple Ads scenarios the change in the proportion of people who chose
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(a) Comparison of Likelihood of Using
Trademark Holders’ Non-Paid Link
(b) Lab Experiment: Comparison of Like-
lihood of Using Trademark Holders’ Paid
Link
(c) Lab Experiment: Comparison of Like-
lihood of Using Non-Trademark Holders’
paid link
(d) Lab Experiment: Comparison of Like-
lihood of continuing search
Figure 5: Lab Experiment
to continue to search for other deals was smaller in the presence of trademarks (18.1 vs 4.4%,
t=2.51, p-value=0.013) and (14% vs 2%, t=2.46, p-value=0.015).
Our experiment also allowed us to verify that the presence of trademarks increased per-
ceptions of clutter. When asked ‘Is this webpage cluttered?’, more people indeed believed
the page was cluttered when trademarks were present (59% vs 68%, t=2.09, p-value=0.04).
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6 Implications
This paper explores how marketing outcomes are affected by the use of trademarks in ads
by third-party sellers who compete with a firm’s direct channel. We use data from a natural
experiment where Google changed its policy to align with that of other major search engines
by permitting the use of trademarks in ad copy. Our results suggest that, surprisingly, this
policy change benefited trademark holders. While trademark holders lost paid clicks, this
decrease was outweighed by a four-fold increase in non-paid clicks. We present evidence that
shows when third-party sellers highlight the brand in their ads, they reduce their sellers’
ability to convey a message distinct from the other ads, such as offering a lower price. As a
result, consumers are less likely to be diverted by paid ads and more likely to click on the
main non-paid link.
Firms have often tried to restrict third-party sellers contractually from competing with
their direct channel in digital advertising. For example, in 2004, InterContinental Hotels
required third-party distributors to agree to not bid on InterContinental’s trademarks on
search engines. InterContinental even severed relationships with Expedia for three years
after it did not agree to these terms. In January 2010, Carnival Cruise Lines, Cunard Line,
Holland America Line, Princess Cruises, and Seabourn Cruises threatened similarly harsh
penalties for travel agencies who bid on trademarked terms. Our results suggest, however,
that such draconian action may be unnecessary. Instead, firms’ direct channels may benefit
if third parties feature their trademarks prominently in ads. When these third-party sellers
focus on the focal brand in their advertising, they inadvertently encourage customers to
purchase from the direct channel as their message, such as a low price, becomes less distinct.
This finding that by loosening their hold on intellectual property online firms can benefit
from marketing spillovers is echoed in the Chiou and Tucker (2010b) finding that replication
of content by non-copyright holders can help promote the copyright holder’s website. This
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implication of course rests on the assumption that, as happened in the case we study, an
increase in trademark use by competitors in their advertising can lead to increased ad clutter
(both in terms of the nature of ads and the number of rivals’ ads).
More broadly, our results provide empirical evidence on the policy question of trade-
marks and search advertising. In the US, the possibility of trademark infringement has been
proposed by researchers such as Clemons and Madhani (2010) as a major justification for
the regulation of search engines. Many lawsuits have been filed in the US over the use of
trademarks in search advertising, and the court decisions have been contradictory. Recently
in Europe, two cases related to the hotel industry, Hotels Meridien v. Google France (2004)
and Accor v. Overture (2004), resulted in search engines paying large fines for allowing
competitors to advertise next to a trademark. These cases have led to attempts to clarify
the law at the European level. The Advocate General of the European Court of Justice,
Poiares Maduro, ruled that ‘Google has not committed a trademark infringement by allow-
ing advertisers to select, in AdWords, search terms corresponding to trademarks.’ However,
crucially for our study, the decision suggested that this exemption did not apply to the use of
trademarks as content featured in ads.22 It is precisely this use of trademarks in the content
of ads that we study in this paper.
There are limitations to our findings. First, the policy change we study was confined to
changes in the ability of a brand’s partners to use the trademark in their ad copy on search
engine ads. This makes it harder to draw conclusions about other potential trademark usage
restrictions, such as restricting other firms from bidding on a competitor’s brand trademark
as a search term or the effect of policies oﬄine. Second, we do not have data on the cost
of paid search before the policy change. The increase in number of bidders on a particular
search term that was occasioned by the policy change may have increased the cost per
click for trademark holders in ways we cannot measure, so we cannot measure how this
22Advocate General’s Opinion in Joined Cases C-236/08, C-237/08 and C-238/08, 22 September 2009.
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change affected search engine revenues. Third, we measure only the number of clicks each
website receives—we cannot measure how the policy change affected reservations. Last,
it is not clear how our results extend to other sectors of the economy where direct sales
are less crucial to the brand-owner’s business model. These limitations notwithstanding,
our empirical analysis does highlight an unexpected consequence of trademark usage in the
digital age with significant implications for firms’ online advertising strategies.
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A Announcement of Google Change in Policy
Update to U.S. ad text trademark policy
Imagine opening your Sunday paper and seeing ads from a large supermarket chain that
didn’t list actual products for sale; instead, they simply listed the categories of products
available - offers like ‘Buy discount cola’ and ‘Snacks on sale.’ The ads wouldn’t be useful
since you wouldn’t know what products are actually being offered. For many categories of
advertisers, this is the problem they have faced on Google for some time.
That is why, in an effort to improve ad quality and user experience, we are adjusting
our trademark policy in the U.S. to allow some ads to use trademarks in the ad text. This
change will bring Google’s policy on trademark use in ad text more in line with the industry
standard. Under certain criteria, you can use trademark terms in your ad text in the U.S.
even if you don’t own that trademark or have explicit approval from the trademark holder
to use it. This change will help you to create more narrowly targeted ad text that highlights
your specific inventory.
For example, under our old policy, a site that sells several brands of athletic shoes may
not have been able to highlight the actual brands that they sell in their ad text. However,
under our new policy, that advertiser can create specific ads for each of the brands that they
sell. We believe that this change will help both our users and advertisers by reducing the
number of overly generic ads that appear across our networks in the U.S.
Please note that this policy update will only apply to ads served in the U.S. on Google.com
and to U.S. users on the Search and Content Networks. Also, while we will start accepting
new ads that contain trademark terms as of 11am PDT on May 15th, those ads will not
begin showing until June 15th.
If you have ads in your account which were previously disapproved for trademark policy
and that comply with the new policy, you may submit those ads for re-review and eligible
ads may begin showing in the U.S. starting June 15th. For instructions on editing your ad
text, click here.
In order to help advertisers understand whether their landing pages meet our policy
guidelines we’ve added some new functionality to our Search Based Keyword Tool. If you
visit www.Google.com/sktool and enter your website URL, you may see a list of brands on
the left side of the page if your site contains those brands. When you click on any of those
brands you’ll notice a column titled ‘Extracted from webpage.’ Those landing pages may be
opportunities for you to show re-sale or informational ads.
We believe that this change will offer you the opportunity to provide users with more
relevant information, choice and options while respecting the interests of trademark holders.
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B Further empirical tables and data description
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Table A-1: Summary of hotel trademark search terms and the associated number
of clicks
No. Brand Beds Total Clicks Percentage of clicks the
advertiser paid for
1 Best Western 315,401 2,243,275 18
2 Hilton 172,605 7,736,176 14
3 Days Inn 151,438 2,142,488 14
4 Hampton Inn 138,481 3,059,937 16
5 Sheraton 135,900 2,466,953 21
6 Super 8 126,175 647,511 21
7 Comfort Inn 110,877 2,661,719 23
8 Ramada Inn 105,986 634,901 17
9 Motel 6 90,243 951,294 34
10 Radisson 90,080 1,039,602 18
11 Crowne Plaza 75,632 655,368 24
12 Quality Inn 72,054 991,570 28
13 Hyatt Regency 69,733 814,748 21
14 La Quinta Inn 61,570 545,764 27
15 Westin 54,200 1,330,296 24
16 Econolodge 49,679 114,342 19
17 Americas Best Value Inn 45,672 82,680 14
18 Embassy Suites 45,172 1,759,598 16
19 Howard Johnson 44,432 542,052 13
20 Hilton Garden Inn 41,669 876,008 11
21 Extended Stay America 40,434 430,036 19
22 Travelodge 37,468 315,035 4
23 Red Roof Inn 36,339 467,829 17
24 Comfort Suites 33,976 591,059 30
25 Country Inn And Suites 32,827 493,340 15
26 Sleep Inn 24,575 347,982 21
27 Clarion Hotel 23,945 170,833 25
28 Wyndham Hotels 22,582 46,348 3
29 Fairmont Hotels 22,407 60,876 26
30 Four Points By Sheraton 21,900 61,259 17
31 Homestead Studio Suites 21,141 64,608 15
32 Knights Inn 16,892 51,747 12
33 Grand Hyatt 16,429 213,530 14
34 Omni Hotels 14,384 19,291 8
35 Rodeway Inn 14,168 176,946 22
36 Candlewood Suites 14,149 418,425 20
37 Doubletree Hotel 14,149 484,530 15
38 Wingate By Wyndham 14,146 67,708 13
39 Drury Inn 14,000 41,716 7
40 Baymont Inn 12,377 241,617 17
41 Studio 6 9,385 21,654 7
42 Hawthorn Suites 8,735 40,519 14
43 Suburban Extended Stay 7,984 16,802 14
44 Park Plaza 7,197 8,128 46
45 Resortquest 6,000 51,677 14
46 Millennium Hotel 5,041 47,321 27
47 Jameson Inn 5,000 44,667 0
48 Hyatt Place 3,794 375,352 26
49 Waldorf Astoria 3,780 41,397 25
50 Hilton Grand Vacation Club 3,740 29,703 2
51 Sandals Resorts 3,234 265,744 25
52 Hyatt Summerfield Suites 3,024 19,476 2
53 Peabody Hotel 1,773 217 100
ab
aNotes: Sample consists of 53 hotel brands names ranked by number of beds. Total clicks
calculated from April 2009-August 2009. Number of beds from Hotels Magazine ‘Top 300 Hotel
Brands,’ July 2007.
bWe only have data on whether a user visited a hotel website rather than whether or not they
booked a hotel room through it. To understand how likely it is that a click led to a booking,
we obtained separate data from Experian Hitwise, a company that also tracks the behavior of
consumers on the Internet, about which websites people visited after visiting an accommodation
website. Most people navigated to tangential sites suggesting that they had completed their
product search. However, it is evident that a certain amount of leakage occurred. For 22.5% of
the time, consumers went to alternative accommodation websites; 9.6% of the time they went to
alternative travel agencies, and 6.4% of the time they returned to a search engine.
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Figure A-1: How the number of clicks changed on Google and Yahoo! monthly analysis
(a) Paid clicks in 2009
(b) non-paid clicks in 2009
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Table A-2: Comparison of demographics of Yahoo! and Google users
April-May 2009 July-August 2009
Google Yahoo! Google Yahoo!
Household Income
> $150,000 8.53% 7.68% 8.18% 8.66%
$100,000 - $149,999 14.52% 12.40% 14.45% 12.69%
$60,000 - $99,999 27.47% 25.86% 27.66% 24.23%
$30,000 - $59,999 29.29% 31.45% 29.55% 30.82%
< $30,000 20.19% 22.60% 20.15% 23.60%
Age
18-24 19.39 20.17 17.61 18.56
25-34 20.82 23.83 20.73 22.45
35-44 22.32 21.17 21.96 20.48
45-54 20.03 17.66 20.38 18.8
55+ 17.45 17.18 19.32 19.72
Gender
Male 50.3 46.92 51.81 47.98
Source: Hitwise
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Table A-3: Relevant changes to search engines operations March 2009-August 2009
Date Change
March 2009 Beta testing starts for new AdWords interface. (This is the interface for the
webpage where advertisers bid for their ads.)
March 24 2009 Two changes were made to how non-paid results were presented. The first
change was an expanded list of useful related searches. The second change
was the addition of longer search result descriptions.
April 6 2009 Google Maps was adjusted so that it presented results even if the user did
not type in a location, based on an algorithm designed to pinpoint a user’s
location.
April 18 2009 AdWords system maintenance. Does not affect display of campaigns.
May 16 2009 AdWords system maintenance. Does not affect display of campaigns.
May 20 2009 Google announces increased personalization for suggestions entered into the
Google search box.
May 14 2009 Google announces ‘search options’ product. This was an optional naviga-
tional toolbar that allowed users to see results for a certain timeframe and
divide video and webpage results.
June 01 2009 Google announces increased efficiency for the comma separated value import
function for its external adword editor.
June 13 2009 AdWords system maintenance. Does not affect display of campaigns.
June 17 2009 Yahoo! introduces new toolbar that allows users to jump to sites such as
Flickr, Yahoo! Mail, and eBay.
July 22 2009 Announcement that advertisers would be able in the coming few weeks to
start to use location extensions, which meant that they would not have to
type in separately an ad for the local section.
June 26 2009 Michael Jackson’s death causes flood of traffic onto search engines. Some
reports of slow response times.
July 11 2009 AdWords system maintenance. Does not affect display of campaigns.
July 29 2009 Announcement that Microsoft will now power Yahoo! search while Yahoo!
will become the exclusive worldwide relationship sales force for both compa-
nies’ premium search advertisers. This change will be effected in late 2011.
July 30 2009 Yahoo! increases amount of information available on local business search
to include photos and details of amenities.
August 8 2009 AdWords system maintenance. Does not affect display of campaigns.
August 24 2009 Yahoo! announces rollout of increasingly integrated homepage for Yahoo!
users and search results.
Source: Yahoo! and Google press releases March-April 2009.
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